2026-09-07T11:35:28Zhttps://ebiltegia.mondragon.edu/oai/request

oai:ebiltegia.mondragon.edu:20.500.11984/146592026-09-06T06:15:44Zcom_20.500.11984_473com_20.500.11984_14090col_20.500.11984_478

Circularity Governance Under Strategic Incentives: A Stackelberg Model of Wind Turbine Blade Recycling Nieto-Cerezo, Oscar Fernandez Mendoza, Joan Manuel Circular Governance Closed-Loop Recycling Circular economy goals under the European Green Deal require business models that make recyclability financially attractive, yet this alignment becomes fragile when eco-design effort is hidden and secondary-market prices are volatile. This paper develops a formal model of the wind-turbine blade (WTB) value chain to examine when closed-loop systems can internalise eco-design incentives. In a Stackelberg game between a manufacturer and a recycler, we show that reintegrating recovered glass fibre reinforced polymer (GFRP) into new WTBs can endogenously reward eco-design by linking material recovery to cost savings. However, this self-alignment weakens under risk aversion and competitive leakage, when recyclers divert material to more profitable external markets. We derive a robustness-adjusted subsidy threshold that ensures closed-loop stability and quantify how it varies with eco-design leverage, price uncertainty and technology choice. Numerical results for pyrolysis and solvolysis highlight how technological maturity and market risk shape feasibility. 2026-09-04T14:39:05Z 2026-09-04T14:39:05Z 2026 1099-0836 https://katalogoa.mondragon.edu/janium-bin/janium_login_opac.pl?find&ficha_no=201247 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11984/14659 eng © 2026 Wiley John Wiley and Sons Ltd