2026-09-07T11:36:24Zhttps://ebiltegia.mondragon.edu/oai/request

oai:ebiltegia.mondragon.edu:20.500.11984/146592026-09-06T06:15:44Zcom_20.500.11984_473com_20.500.11984_14090col_20.500.11984_478

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Nieto-Cerezo, Oscar author Fernandez Mendoza, Joan Manuel author 2026 Circular economy goals under the European Green Deal require business models that make recyclability financially attractive, yet this alignment becomes fragile when eco-design effort is hidden and secondary-market prices are volatile. This paper develops a formal model of the wind-turbine blade (WTB) value chain to examine when closed-loop systems can internalise eco-design incentives. In a Stackelberg game between a manufacturer and a recycler, we show that reintegrating recovered glass fibre reinforced polymer (GFRP) into new WTBs can endogenously reward eco-design by linking material recovery to cost savings. However, this self-alignment weakens under risk aversion and competitive leakage, when recyclers divert material to more profitable external markets. We derive a robustness-adjusted subsidy threshold that ensures closed-loop stability and quantify how it varies with eco-design leverage, price uncertainty and technology choice. Numerical results for pyrolysis and solvolysis highlight how technological maturity and market risk shape feasibility. 1099-0836 https://katalogoa.mondragon.edu/janium-bin/janium_login_opac.pl?find&ficha_no=201247 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11984/14659 Circular Governance Closed-Loop Recycling Circularity Governance Under Strategic Incentives: A Stackelberg Model of Wind Turbine Blade Recycling